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 At some point before five  P.M. on 25 June 1914, in the small coastal town 
of Lowestoft, Suffolk, 59-year old Louisa Ashby cuts her own throat with 
a razor and lies down on her bed. Her eight-year-old granddaughter, 
Dora, discovers her covered in blood, and runs back downstairs to inform 
her mother that ‘grandmother had cut her finger’. 1 Ashby is rushed to 
the nearby Lowestoft and North Suffolk Hospital, where, according to 
the East Suffolk Police:
 The [hospital] matron then requested that an officer should stay and 
take the sole charge and responsibility of the patient. I told her we 
could not do that, and that two of her sons were present [for this 
purpose], she said, ‘They are no good, you brought her here and must 
take the sole charge of her, or take her away’. 2 
 The matron accuses the police of ‘not doing your duty ... the woman has 
committed attempted murder [ sic ], and you should charge her ... there is 
always this bother about cases brought here by the Police, and has been 
for years’, and she even threatens to take Ashby and put her outside the 
hospital gates. 3 Ashby dies two days later. The dispute reaches the deputy 
chief constable who is unmoved, quoting East Suffolk Constabulary’s 
general orders from 1902, to the effect that ‘such patients are not in the 
custody of the police, [thus] he cannot take the responsibility of their 
safe custody’. 4 There is acknowledgement of ambiguity around the issue 
of responsibility, but there is one certainty: ‘[T]he police are responsible 
for ensuring that ... at all events the offence shall not be repeated’. 5 
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 As this case is not read as a cry for help, and as it involves neither an 
overdose nor cutting of the arms, this might seem a strange place to 
start. The relevance of this case is that it shows how behaviour broadly 
conceived as self-destructive comes to the attention of hospitals (and 
more generally) in context-specific ways. Focusing upon how hospitals 
become concerned with self-harming behaviour before the ‘overdose as 
cry for help’ epidemic, between 1950 and 1980, sheds important light 
upon it. The idea of ‘self-harm’ as we presently understand it does not 
exist in 1914. The late-Victorian concern labelled ‘self-mutilation’ is 
significantly different, as it includes practices such as swallowing or 
inserting needles into oneself, self-castration, enucleation (eye removal) 
and eating rubbish, alongside the more familiar cutting, flesh-picking 
and self-biting. As Sarah Chaney clearly states: self-cutting ‘is not 
emphasised in nineteenth-century writings’. 6 We shall also see later how 
the early 1950s communicative attempted suicide is distinct. The Ashby 
case is an example of what is called a ‘would-be suicide’, a concern that 
involves hospitals and police, as well as workhouse staff and coroners. 
This chapter offers an explanation as to why a cut-throat would-be 
suicide is a concern in the early twentieth century and why, towards the 
late 1930s, it might be displaced by the beginnings of a different kind of 
self-harm, haltingly conceptualised in more social, interpersonal terms. 
 A Home Office file at the National Archives documents a series of 
disputes between hospitals and police forces in England and Wales over 
patients like Ashby, thought to have attempted suicide and brought to 
hospital by police (suicide and attempted suicide are illegal in England 
and Wales until 1961). On a practical level these records exist due to a 
debate about who is responsible for taking custody of the ‘would-be’ 
suicide in the absence of a police charge, and whether the cost of 
watching these patients should be borne by the police. 7 
 This financial dispute centres upon characteristics of ‘renewal’ and 
‘violence’. Broadly, renewal expresses a concern that the attempt will 
be repeated, usually at the first available opportunity, having failed the 
first time. Thus the attempt is cast as a genuine effort at ending life. 
Although the terms ‘renewal’ and ‘repetition’ are used interchangeably 
to describe this, renewal is preferred here to emphasise the difference 
between this concern and post-war usage. In the later period, ‘repeated 
attempted suicide’ indicates that a person resorts to an attempt at 
suicide at a number of different points, with each repetition considered 
distinct; subsequent efforts are not seen as trying to rectify the results of 
earlier suicidal episodes. 8 The second characteristic, ‘violence’, is more 
self-explanatory. However, in this context it is not always clear whether 
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the violence is imagined as predominantly self-directed or directed 
towards others (in the former case it is largely indistinguishable from 
a renewal of the attempt). Violence and renewal are central because if 
patients are thought likely to renew their attempt or use violence then 
the Home Office considers that police are obliged to watch them, or to 
pay for civilian watchers to ensure that this does not occur. The obliga-
tion is thought to exist even if the person has not been charged with the 
common-law misdemeanour of ‘attempted suicide’ (and therefore is not 
formally in the custody of the police). 
 In this way, characteristics of this would-be suicide are bound up 
with context-specific economic concerns. Some police officers see much 
police time lost on behalf of ‘nervous medical superintendents’ who 
push for police to watch most cases; on the other hand hospital staff 
express resentment at the police bringing in cases that constitute a drain 
on voluntary hospital funds. 9 In the pre-NHS era, these are charitable 
funds, either an endowment from a wealthy person, or subscriptions 
and voluntary contributions from members of the public. Care at volun-
tary hospitals is considered ‘better than the poor law, if one could get it’, 
but this is bound up with being deemed worthy of charitable relief, or 
having a letter of recommendation from a subscriber or governor. 10 
 Part of this financial dispute mutates into a therapeutic dispute with 
financial consequences. This concerns violence again, but also a new 
category of ‘restraint’. At issue in the therapeutic dispute is whether the 
most significant aspect of attempted suicide is the somatic, physical, 
injury or the presumed underlying mental disorder. Ideas of renewal 
and violence, emphasised in the practical negotiations around police 
involvement, have another set of resonances with mental disorder 
through the presumed need for restraint. This aspect emerges most 
clearly at a 1922 inquest into the death of William Bardsley, a clerk 
from Stockport. Administrators and workers at a voluntary hospital turn 
Bardsley away, claiming that their hospital (and others like it) are unsuit-
able for attempted suicides because of the potential for violence, which 
is seen to require the restraining capabilities of mental therapeutics. The 
mental blocks of workhouse infirmaries (not asylums) are considered 
more appropriate. Bardsley is sent to a workhouse some distance away. 
Those in charge of the workhouse, the Poor Law Guardians, admit him. 
However, they do so without accepting the arguments of the volun-
tary hospital. Instead, they emphasise the somatic, surgical needs of his 
cut throat, claiming that the voluntary hospital is better equipped in 
that sense. Thus, although would-be suicides appear in the Home Office 
files due to a financial dispute, their emergence and significance is also 
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related to a negotiation between the distinct therapeutic approaches of 
general and mental medicine. This division is constituted here between 
voluntary hospitals and workhouse infirmaries; mental hospitals refuse 
to take such patients until their physical injuries are stable. In addition, 
they also seem too geographically remote to be realistically considered 
in an emergency. 
 The respective positions of mental and general medicine shift in 
1929–30, meaning that these debates over violence and restraint, over 
therapeutics and finance, recede somewhat. The archetype of the cut 
throat, and the violence and anxiety that surrounds it, is less relevant 
to the new context. Other methods and other readings begin to emerge, 
hand in hand with a sense of psychologically invested self-harm, where 
the goal of the behaviour is ambiguous – the beginnings of the concern 
with communicative self-harm. The Local Government Act 1929 abol-
ishes the Poor Law, and the Mental Treatment Act 1930 broadens the 
scope for uncertified – so-called ‘informal’ – mental treatment. This 
brings mental and general medical therapeutics closer together, prin-
cipally around the old workhouse mental blocks in former Poor Law 
infirmaries, now called mental observation wards in local authority 
hospitals. These wards are associated with mental illness and the use of 
restraint, but also as a diagnostic ‘clearing station’, a place where mental 
and general medicine interact, forming a distinctive field of visibility. 
 Finally, the work of Frederick Hopkins at a Liverpool observation ward 
can show how these combinations begin to make visible a communica-
tive attempted suicide, through the opportunity for psychiatric scrutiny 
of patients presenting at hospital due to a physical injury. The methods 
most commonly reported here are coal gas, liquid corrosive and medica-
tion poisoning. Poisoning thus seems to resonate with the psychological 
ambiguity that becomes well-established in the 1960s. Hopkins’s object 
emerges through an uneasy negotiation between the persistently sepa-
rated approaches of general and mental medicine. General practitioner 
C.A.H. Watts recalls in 1966 that ‘[f]ew of us who qualified in the middle 
[nineteen-] thirties found ourselves equipped with any knowledge of 
psychiatry ... Medicine in those hospital days was almost completely an 
affair of organic diseases, and any psychiatric casualty was viewed as 
the usurper of a useful hospital bed – something to be removed with 
almost unseemly haste’. 11 The practice of mental and general medicine 
changes, as do the differences and negotiations between them. However, 
because this object is consistently seen as involving a physical element 
(the self-inflicted injury) and a mental element (anyone wanting to 
injure themselves must be mentally disordered in some way), it emerges 
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reliably, though in a variety of ways, in a liminal space between these 
two regimes. 
 Renewal, responsibility and economics 
 In the case of Louisa Ashby, as noted, the Home Office decides that 
it is the police’s responsibility to ensure that ‘the offence shall not 
be repeated’. This concern with repetition or renewal also surfaces in 
a dispute over one Frederick Newman in Wiltshire in 1915. In this 
case the Home Office decides that although ‘no charge of attempting 
suicide was made against him there was some risk of his repeating the 
attempt’. 12 The police are reluctant to charge a person with the offence 
of attempting suicide, because this involves taking responsibility for 
that person. However, hospitals consider such individuals as patients 
who need to be watched. Thus ‘would-be suicides’ emerge here (and are 
recorded as such) according to the quality of renewal. 
 This is inseparable from economic concerns. In 1914 the clerk of 
Lowestoft Hospital’s Management Committee initiates the exchange over 
Ashby with the Home Office, emphasising ‘the heavy expense which the 
Institution has to bear in the care of these Patients’. 13 The Home Office 
appears sympathetic to this point, advising the police that ‘if as appears 
to be the case the Lowestoft Hospital is under private management and 
is supported entirely by voluntary contributions, the police have no very 
clear claim on the services of the staff in respect of cases brought there 
by them’. In addition: ‘Mr. Reginald McKenna [Home Secretary] would 
be glad to know whether the question of making some contribution to 
the Hospital from Police funds has been considered’. 14 
 Economics are also a concern for the police. In a 1923 letter from the 
Metropolitan Police to the British Hospitals Association, it is argued that 
due to economic necessity, the force has decided to stop performing 
duties that they believe ‘cannot strictly be held to devolve upon them’. 
Thus they are ‘unable to sanction the employment in all cases of Police 
Officers to watch would-be suicides’. However, they are ‘prepared to 
do so in the comparatively few instances where the patient exhibits a 
desire to repeat the attempt, or is really violently disposed’. 15 In this way, 
‘would-be suicides’ are characterised in terms of a specific debate around 
economics, to do with repetition and violence. In Liverpool in 1920, 
‘[i]t is not suggested that the Police should supply watchers for all persons 
whom they may take to a hospital or infirmary after attempted suicide, 
but only that they should do so when there is reasonable ground for 
fearing that the attempt at suicide will be renewed or that other violence 
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may be used’. 16 This economic concern brings out renewal and violence 
together, demonstrating that key qualities of this object of concern (its 
potential to be repeated and its violence) emerge directly as a function 
of a specific economic negotiation. 
 Violence and separated therapeutics 
 However, violence has a different salience in debates over whether 
would-be suicides should be treated in workhouse infirmaries or volun-
tary hospitals. In the early twentieth century, workhouse infirmaries 
are places where mental and general medical therapeutics co-exist to a 
greater extent than in many other institutions. The involvement of this 
boundary between therapeutic regimes in the emergence and persistence 
of attempted suicide runs throughout this book. However, it is constituted 
and negotiated in different ways in different contexts. In this particular 
discussion, the issue of appropriate care is brought to light in ways that 
still feed off the violence and economic concerns outlined above. 
 In 1907, a Home Office ruling on the correct place for these patients 
to be taken does not mention the facilities for treatment, but a more 
diffuse sense of the ‘character’ of certain cases. There is a legal obligation 
to admit emergencies to both workhouses and voluntary hospitals, but 
‘police should use discretion’ when asking to admit cases to voluntary 
hospitals ‘different in character from those which are ordinarily received 
there’. 17 This seems more to do with the type of case, rather than the 
character of the patient. It is possibly a continuance of what Geoffrey 
Rivett notes of early nineteenth-century voluntary hospital emergen-
cies: ‘Medical staff made a rapid assessment of the clinical priority of 
those attending, who were well aware that a judgment was also being 
made on whether they were fit objects of charitable relief’. 18 However, 
moralistic judgements bound up with charity could well continue to 
militate against admitting attempted suicide cases to voluntary hospitals 
in the early twentieth century. Whilst the Home Office clearly implies 
that attempted suicides are ‘different in character’ from other voluntary 
hospital cases, both workhouse infirmaries and voluntary hospitals are 
considered – from a legal standpoint in any case – equally valid. 
 In 1920 it emerges that the Liverpool police do not take would-be 
suicides to voluntary hospitals. They judge the workhouse infirmary 
especially suited for such cases due to the ‘qualified persons’ there. For 
this reason, extra expense on police watchers ‘hardly seems justified’. 
This has turned from a diffuse and ambiguous concern about the type of 
cases admitted (with possible moral overtones) to a debate about thera-
peutic facilities – but still interwoven in a different way with economic 
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questions. This feeds into an explicit statement about the potential 
violence of such cases: ‘The official nurses [at workhouses] are expected 
to supervise mental patients, dangerous at times, when the risk of 
attack or injury to their attendants is much greater than that incurred 
through the care of suicidal persons whose violence would be probably 
only an attempt at further self-destruction’. 19 Thus facilities at the work-
house infirmary are implied to be appropriate for dealing with both the 
somatic consequences and the potentially dangerous ‘mental’ aspect of 
these cases. The Home Office response does not attempt to alter the 
terms of the debate. Whilst reiterating the position that violence is key 
in cases of attempted suicide, the argument also takes in the capabilities 
of ordinary hospital staff (i.e., not trained to deal with mental illness). 
The position is that ‘[t]he police should pay for watching of patients 
‘when there is reasonable ground for fearing that the attempt at suicide 
will be renewed or that other violence may be used and the ordinary 
hospital staff is insufficient to prevent it’. 20 The idea of a potentially 
violent would-be suicide is in a central position in an economic battle 
that is also fought around assessments of appropriate facilities. 
 It is unsurprising that would-be suicide is constituted on a specific 
continuum of violence when the whole administrative machinery by 
which such cases are looked after – and their care paid for – hinges upon 
assessments of that violence. But the debate about potential violence is 
also inextricably bound up with the question of how far an attempted 
suicide indicates mental illness. 
 A ‘joy ride’ between separate therapeutic regimes 
 The intimate relationship between assessments of violence and the 
suitability of general or mental therapeutics is clearly illustrated by a 
1922 dispute at Ashton-under-Lyne, a small town between Manchester, 
Oldham and Stockport in the North-West of England. The inquest 
following a man’s death causes enough of a stir to be covered by 
the London  Evening Standard and the  Manchester Guardian . On 27 
January, William Bardsley, a clerk from Stockport, arrives at the District 
Infirmary, Ashton with a cut throat. He is refused admission and taken 
to the Lake (workhouse) Hospital, where he is admitted as an emer-
gency, even though he is not from an area covered by that Poor Law 
Union. One result of the dispute is that the patient is ferried between 
institutions in search of treatment. At the inquest into his subsequent 
death it is observed that ‘[i]t is very hard to give a dying man a “joy 
ride” between hospital and hospital’. 21 This is a clear indication of the 
separation of one type of scrutiny from another, which is particularly 
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problematic in emergency cases. The dispute over the appropriate care 
of attempted suicides is articulated in terms of ‘attempted suicide as 
physical injury’ (appropriate for voluntary hospitals) against ‘attempted 
suicide as mental disorder’ (appropriate for the mental block of Poor 
Law infirmaries). 
 The roots (and often the buildings themselves) of what become obser-
vation wards lie in these mental blocks of Poor Law infirmaries such as 
Lake Hospital. Hugh Freeman notes that Poor Law Union infirmaries are 
built during the 1860s to care for the increasing number of workhouse 
occupants who are ‘ill or decrepit’, and further, that ‘most infirmaries 
had an observation unit or “mental block”’, where cases are admitted 
and then either transferred to a mental hospital or discharged. 22 After 
the Lunacy Act of 1890, which ‘consolidated previous legislation on 
emergency admission’, observation wards are set up and ‘mainly sited 
in Poor Law hospitals, and aimed to provide initial assessment of mental 
illness as a preliminary to admission to a mental hospital’. 23 St Francis’s 
observation ward in South London, the source of much of the clinical 
material in Stengel’s  Attempted Suicide (1958), is part of the Constance 
Road Workhouse from 1895 until 1930, when the institution is renamed 
St Francis’ Hospital. 
 At the start of the Ashton controversy, a letter is sent to the guard-
ians of the Lake Hospital, explaining the (voluntary) district infirmary’s 
position. Some time before the incident occurs, a pre-emptive letter is 
sent by the infirmary to the local police asking them ‘not to send to 
the District Infirmary cases which they might have cause to consider 
were cases of attempted suicide’. 24 The extent to which this relies upon 
the attempted suicide being cast as a mentally ill rather than physically 
injured case is clear:
 1. That it is a rule of the District Infirmary that persons of unsound 
mind should not be admitted as patients. 2. That most juries find that 
a person who commits suicide does so while temporarily insane. 3. 
That under a Home Office Regulation the Police are not now called 
upon to provide an Officer to watch over such cases where the patient 
is not under arrest. 4. To send such a person to an Infirmary like the 
District Infirmary, Ashton-under-Lyne, is liable to cause distress to 
other patients, and considerable dislocation and possible addition to 
the staff. 25 
 In the four above points, mental state, police practice and financial cost 
(‘addition to the staff’) are woven together to cast would-be suicides 
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as mental patients more suitable for the workhouse mental ward 
attendants. 
 The importance of appropriate staff/facilities is demonstrated by 
the coroner at the inquest, who invokes the concerns about violence, 
stating that ‘he understood the Infirmary authorities could not take 
cases of suicide [ sic ] because they had not the necessary staff to deal 
with patients who might become violent’. A cut throat evinces a suicide 
attempt which, in turn implies violence. Thus, the facilities at the district 
infirmary claimed to be unsuitable, and they should not provide (or pay 
for) treatment. 
 The following exchange, reprinted in  The Reporter newspaper, shows 
how seemingly exclusive mental and physical therapeutics become 
absolutely vital to the resolution of this case. Dr O’Connor, assistant 
medical superintendent at Lake (workhouse) Hospital argues that ‘the 
patient should have been detained at the Infirmary where the staff had 
more experience of surgical cases, and was more accustomed to dealing 
with them’. He explicitly casts the case as one of somatic injury – a 
surgical question. The coroner responds that ‘there were no male nurses 
at the Infirmary’, which is incomprehensible – given the irrelevance of 
nurses of any gender to the propriety of surgical procedures – unless it is 
seen as bringing the argument back to a debate about restraint. H. Hall 
Daley (clerk to the guardians at Lake Hospital) clearly understands this 
as he replies that they do not have any male nurses either: ‘We only 
have the mental ward attendants’. The coroner’s reply explicitly posi-
tions attempted suicide as more mental than somatic before eliding this 
into a supposition of potential violence through the method of injury: 
‘Well, a case like this is treated more as a mental case. At the Infirmary I 
am told they don’t receive cases where violence has been used’. Violence 
again emerges here explicitly as a function of a debate about appropriate 
hospital provision, across a psyche/soma split. However, O’Connor is 
not done and attempts to drag the case back onto somatic terrain, where 
the attempted suicide would be more suitable for the infirmary: ‘in cases 
of haemorrhage it was essential that a person should be attended to as 
speedily as possible, and the Infirmary was equipped for that class of 
work’. Daley adds that ‘the Infirmary, which largely existed for surgical 
cases, was better equipped to deal with that class of patient’. 26 
 The negotiation of psyche and soma takes place across a divide between 
workhouses and general hospitals. These positions are not disputed, and 
Daley openly acknowledges the presence of mental nurses. The debate 
is pursued through a contest over whether the essence of a case of 
attempted suicide is mental or physical. The contested essence in this 
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particular context enables violence to be consistently invoked. Thus the 
potential for violence emerges between therapeutic techniques. 
 The  Manchester Guardian ’s report emphasises the financial aspect over 
the therapeutic dispute. 27 However, rather than reduce the significance 
of the case to any one primary cause, it is useful to sketch out the argu-
ments pursued in these different registers. The arguments that reach the 
Home Office are more likely to involve the spending of public money 
and the police, whereas those issues recede in a coroner’s court where 
it is a question of establishing fault or not in a particular death. This 
becomes transposed onto the technical question of facilities (which is 
accepted by both parties) and the question of facilities best equipped to 
deal with violence. The point is to lay out a field of argument, structured 
by a specific mental/physical divide, where attempted suicide emerges. 
 Differences and similarities – rupture and continuity? 
 The characteristic of violence is almost totally absent from the post-1945 
epidemic of attempted suicide. It might be argued that this is because 
‘self-poisoning’ – the most visible method until the 1980s in Britain – 
is passive, and that cut throats used in the overwhelming majority of 
disputed cases here is an active and violent method. However, this book 
seeks to understand why certain methods emerge in certain contexts, in 
the course of specific debates. In a dispute involving police presence and 
the division between mental and general medicine, it is no wonder that 
violence and repetition come to the fore. Dealing with violence through 
restraint is seen as a key part of the job for both mental-ward attend-
ants and the police (in their different ways), so the cases involving argu-
ments for or against the presence of these professionals are likely to be 
described in those terms. 
 If we accept that there is no essential quality to any action independent 
of context, we can investigate how certain actions come to be classified 
as violent or passive or (self-) destructive. Because a cut throat usually 
involves a bladed object (considered in this context as more generally 
and immediately dangerous than a bottle of pills, for example), and 
because its repair seems to require the distinctly somatic specialism of 
surgery, this method seems most obviously to call for police involve-
ment and also to straddle this somatic/psychiatric divide. 
 As for renewal, it might be argued that this has nothing to do with 
the context and that it is merely logical that a person who attempts 
to commit suicide and fails would be likely to renew the attempt, to 
complete the suicide. However, it is precisely a disruption of this 
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logic that undergirds the post-war epidemic, arguing against ideas of 
attempted suicide as bungled or incompetent. The idea of repeated 
suicide attempts certainly emerges in the post-1945 discussions, but 
as noted above, this repetition is cast as a repeated response to social 
situations, an habitual coping mechanism, rather than as an immediate 
attempt to rectify the failure of the first attempt. 
 The violence largely disappears, and the repetition is fundamentally 
reconstituted. However, one aspect of these disputes flags up a subtle link 
between the attempted suicide of the 1920s and that of the late 1950s 
and 1960s – in addition to the idea that both emerge in the borderlands 
between mental and physical medicine. This concerns friends and rela-
tives. Throughout the debate, the police consistently state that they are 
to employ watchers only until friends or relatives can be found to take 
charge. An order for East Suffolk Police from 1902 states that they will 
only pay for watchers ‘where the person has no friends or relatives able 
to take care of him, or when such friends or relatives are unwilling to 
perform or pay for such a service’. 28 A Staffordshire Police order from 
1904 states that ‘[i]t is always open, to friends or relations ... to make 
such provision as they think fit for the care and medical treatment of 
these persons’. 29 In 1916 the Metropolitan Police commissioner states 
that the discretion over a charge for attempted suicide is ‘based partly on 
the question whether the offender had any friends or relations willing 
to take charge of him’. 30 The consistent use of family and friends – and 
indeed the idea of watchers being a substitute for them – is a convenient 
administrative response to deal with legal ambiguity and supposedly 
nervous medical superintendents. 
 So whilst the notion of attempted suicide as cry for help has broad 
ancestry, it seems possible that the understanding of attempted suicide as 
primarily a communication with a social circle becomes more obvious if 
the first response of the police is to contact members of that social circle 
to come and watch over the attempter (a practice that does not totally 
disappear until 1961). This is not a case of one state of affairs being a 
‘prototype’ of a later version of attempted suicide. During this period, 
ideas about the causes of psychological illness move away from concerns 
about heredity, the nervous system or brain lesions, and begin to focus 
more upon social relationships, emotional attachments and adequate 
adjustment (in infancy and adulthood), all things that place other 
people in a vitally important position in relation to a person’s mental 
health. It is also the case that concerns about social issues – such as child 
guidance, marriage guidance and mental hygiene – emerge between the 
wars (see also Chapter 2). These concerns, which are decisively adopted 
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by the state post-1945, feed into the self-evidence of the ‘social setting’ 
and its impacts. Thus, what begins as an administrative response to a 
suspected attempted suicide can obtain new intellectual resonance and 
salience. A practice rooted in the fear of renewal in general hospitals, 
and in a legally ambiguous situation, might also provide a basis (and an 
audience) for communicative self-harm. 
 Attempted suicide emerges at a point where confusion is keenly felt 
over the roles of the legal and medical professions in ministering to 
certain kinds of injuries (principally a cut throat) that require hospital 
treatment. Legal ambiguity, financial pressures (on both hospitals and 
police) and the separation of psychiatric and general medicine create 
a field of visibility for attempted suicide that emphasises renewal and 
violence as the two key characteristics. There is no sense of communi-
cative self-harm in the Home Office and police files; instead there is a 
danger of repetition and a threat of violence (which does not consistently 
differentiate between a renewed attempt and violence towards others). 
Indeed, the fear of renewed attempt – which is the basis for employing 
a watcher – seems to at least imply some sort of earnest desire to kill 
oneself. The police contest that a watcher is always necessary, but there 
is no sense of a communicative demonstration. However, the consistent 
invocation of relatives or friends (the first port of call for watching those 
recovering from an attempt) might encourage the apparent self-evidence 
of an attempt at suicide performed as a communication to a social circle, 
a cry for help. 
 These disputes form a counterpoint to Stengel’s lament in the late 
1950s about the lack of machinery for the registration of attempted 
suicide. In the 1920s, would-be suicides emerge precisely because there 
is no single administrative, legal or medical body to assume responsi-
bility for these cases. A more systematic process of recording emerges 
when the therapeutic regimes are not seen as a ‘joy ride’ away from each 
other. This begins to happen in the 1920s and 1930s, as the workhouse 
infirmaries are consolidated into local-authority hospitals and come to 
contain the potential for both mental and general medical scrutiny. 
 From workhouse infirmary to mental observation 
ward (1929–30) 
 The disputes in the 1910s and 1920s bring would-be suicide to light 
through a process of negotiation between the distinct therapeutic 
regimes of the voluntary hospital and the mental block of the work-
house, or Poor Law, infirmary. However, these blocks and observation 
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wards come to form a much more complex space than suggested by 
the polemic pursued in the Ashton inquest. They become more promi-
nent during the 1930s as mental observation wards. To sum up mental 
observation wards in early-to-mid-twentieth century Britain is difficult. 
Richard Mayou, founder and first chairman of the Section for Liaison 
Psychiatry at the Royal College of Psychiatrists, laments that ‘[l]ittle is 
known of how they operated’. 31 They vary widely in their functions and 
available resources, according to place and over time. These disclaimers 
aside, an interwar observation ward might cautiously be characterised 
as having two main functions: first, as a place for the initial assessment 
of psychological disorder with regard to mental-hospital admission; 
second, for the temporary care of cases deemed acute, disruptive or diffi-
cult – often with the implication that mental abnormality is behind 
such behaviour. This workhouse heritage is widely acknowledged in the 
literature produced in the early 1960s around general-hospital psychi-
atric units. In 1963, two clinicians working at St Clement’s Hospital in 
London note that ‘the observation wards [are] situated mainly in the 
poorer municipal hospitals or [former] Poor Law institutions of the great 
cities’ of Britain. 32 In Pickstone’s 1992 case study of general hospital 
psychiatry in Manchester, he mentions that ‘the ex-workhouse mental 
blocks ... afforded the opportunity for an alternative mode of develop-
ment’ for psychiatric practice not centred on the county asylums. 33 
 The wards are transformed around 1929–30. First ‘the Local 
Government Act [1929] placed the old Poor Law Hospitals under local 
authority control’. 34 In 1938 a report on London observation wards 
comments that the ‘chief feature of the [1929] reorganisation of the 
observation wards in the Metropolitan area has been the concentra-
tion of these wards in six General Hospitals’. 35 The Act ‘empowered the 
London County Council to appropriate to their health service any work-
houses used for hospital purposes’. In addition to the 1929 Act, ‘Section 
19 of the Mental Treatment Act, 1930, allowed the use of these institu-
tions for the detention of mental patients’. 36 Thus the wards are further 
entrenched into both general medical and mental therapeutics. Not 
only are the wards brought closer to general hospitals, they are assigned 
a role (initial assessment) under the Mental Treatment Act of 1930 on a 
national scale. 
 The 1930 Mental Treatment Act (or the preceding Royal Commission, 
1924–6) is often the starting point for twentieth-century histories 
of the integration of general and mental medicine in Britain. Walter 
Symington Maclay, a key figure in post-war mental health policy, is a 
keen advocate of integration, attempting to ‘bring psychiatry into the 
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stream of the rest of medicine’. 37 When, in 1963, he lays out three crucial 
twentieth-century events for psychiatry, he begins with ‘1930, when the 
Mental Treatment Act for the first time allowed voluntary admissions 
to mental hospitals and development of outpatient departments on a 
national scale’. 38 Whilst he considers the Lunacy Act (1890) and Mental 
Deficiency Act (1913) important, the 1930 Act ‘ushered in the era of 
mental disorder as an integral part of medicine’. 39 The Act’s integrative 
impact is widely recognised. In  Social Science and Social Pathology (1959), 
Barbara Wootton quotes the preceding Royal Commission’s recommen-
dation that the law should be changed so that ‘the treatment of mental 
disorder should approximate as nearly [as possible] to the treatment of 
physical ailments’. 40 In Maclay’s reading, especially, the story of twen-
tieth-century psychiatric progress in general seems identical with the 
processes of integration between general and psychiatric medicine. 
 The act enables local authorities to establish psychiatric outpatient 
clinics, and treat patients without formal certification, integration that is 
also helped by local health authorities appropriating observation wards 
and consolidating them into general hospitals. It is not often made clear 
enough that observation wards constitute a key intersection between 
general hospitals and mental medicine. This perception is central due 
to the enduring association between observation wards and attempted 
suicide. 
 Observation wards: diagnostics and the contested 
nature of treatment 
 In 1937, the  Journal of Mental Science publishes an article describing 
St Francis’s observation ward. Attempted suicide appears here as a distinct 
object: there are ‘33 cases of attempted or threatened suicide’ admitted 
under Section 20 of the Lunacy Act and ‘12 suicidal attempts’ admitted 
by police officers. 41 No further comment is given; the attempted suicides 
are not seen as a special target for investigation, but they are a distinct 
entity. In the 1938 report on the six London County Council (LCC) 
observation wards (by Aubrey Lewis and Flora Calder), patients ‘with 
suicidal tendencies’ are counted among the groups ‘peculiar to observa-
tion wards’. 42 Similarly, Frederick Hopkins of Smithdown Road Hospital, 
Liverpool, in 1943 claims that there are ‘three fairly common reasons 
for admission for observation ... attempted suicide, epilepsy, and G.P.I. 
[General Paralysis of the Insane]’. 43 Lewis and Calder note that these 
wards are ‘somewhat isolated from the whole system of the mental 
health services’. 44 Positioned between psychic and somatic therapeutics, 
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and significantly associated with attempted suicide, the observation 
ward’s attributes in the field of security and restraint are key in associa-
tions with attempted suicide. 
 During the interwar period observation wards are intended to accom-
modate patients on a temporary basis, but this does not mean that they 
take voluntary patients. (The increasing levels of non-temporary elderly 
patients, stuck in observation wards because there are no suitable places 
for them to go, is a cause for considerable concern.) Patients are usually 
detained for an initial three days; before this period expires a magistrate 
is required to see the patient. Detention can then continue for a further 
14 days. 45 After this combined period of 17 days, the patient is usually 
either sufficiently recovered to be discharged or needs to be transferred, 
whether voluntarily or involuntarily to a psychiatric hospital. This time 
is usually spent observing patients in order to diagnose them prior to 
disposition, but this process becomes augmented by a growing (though 
contested) treatment role. 
 During the 1930s ‘[o]bservation wards are still in their infancy so far 
as their developmental possibilities are concerned – in fact we are still 
in the process of deciding what their purpose should be’. 46 The diag-
nostic function seems agreed in the 1930s; there is significantly more 
uncertainty about what else might be attempted in observation wards. 
Treatment is at the centre of the changes. The Board of Control (the 
national body that until 1959 oversees and regulates mental treatment 
in England and Wales) is against this, arguing in 1935 that ‘[o]nce it has 
been established that a patient requires treatment for mental illness, no 
time should be lost in transferring him to the mental hospital, which in 
general is the only place able to provide the specialized experience and 
the therapeutic resources necessary for successful treatment’. The board 
further states: ‘Every improvement of the observation wards increases 
the temptation to undertake active treatment, a practice quite incon-
sistent with the main purpose of such wards, which is the diagnosis of 
doubtful cases’. 47 The Board of Control is clear: mental treatment must 
take place in a mental hospital, and only there; observation wards are 
diagnostic clearing stations and gateways to the more specialised mental 
hospitals. 
 This effort to keep mental treatment solely within mental hospitals is 
undermined by the wards’ agreed role in diagnostic clearing. In 1940 the 
impossibility of separating psychological investigation from treatment 
is explicitly stated: ‘Investigation  is treatment – as those who deal exclu-
sively with psychoneuroses constantly emphasize’. 48 Such investigation 
is central to the wards, in their role as a diagnostic gateway: there is 
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‘a tendency to regard them [observation wards] as psychiatric casualty-
clearing stations’. 49 The military language of ‘clearing station’ is signifi-
cant, given the established links between the First and Second World 
Wars and the proliferation of psychiatric techniques. 50 The term ‘clearing-
hospital’ first appears (according to the  Oxford English Dictionary ) in the 
 Lancet in 1914. The term ‘clearing-station’ (deemed equivalent) appears 
in 1915. The former term has a history before the First World War: an 
article entitled ‘The Casualty Clearing Station’ states in 1917: ‘Prior to 
the present war, this unit was designated a “clearing hospital”; but the 
nomenclature was altered to “casualty clearing station” soon after the 
commencement of the present campaign [the First World War]’. 51 These 
clearing stations come to prominence during the 1914–18 war, but it is 
in the Second World War (1939–45) that frontline psychiatric treatment 
is carried out in them. 
 There is also a non-military parallel, seen as David Armstrong traces 
twentieth-century social medicine back to a tuberculosis dispensary 
described as ‘a receiving house and a centre of diagnosis ... a clearing 
house and a centre for observation ... a treatment centre’. 52 The func-
tions of diagnosis, treatment and observation all feature in debates 
around observation wards. Given Armstrong’s compelling argument 
that the logic driving the practice of this dispensary is the same as that 
driving community-focussed, social medicine, the imminent emergence 
here of attempted suicide, similarly rooted in social environments and 
relationships, is illuminating. 
 Observation wards are clearly implicated in the negotiation between 
psychiatric and somatic therapeutics, and some are even treatment 
centres in the 1930s: ‘[I]n certain cases, active treatment ... is to be encour-
aged, and that in fairness to the patient, it should be practised whilst 
the diagnosis of difficult cases is proceeding’. 53 As treatment is a more 
involved form of scrutiny or practice than simply diagnosis, the level of 
psychological scrutiny in these wards is – unevenly – increasing. 
 Lewis’s and Calder’s findings in 1938 are more in tune with the sharp 
differentiation desired by the Board of Control, stating that ‘these obser-
vation units function largely, if not solely, as clearing stations’. They 
note that ‘[i]n none of the wards did we find any attempt at prolonged 
treatment of the patients’. The operative word here is ‘prolonged’; they 
visit St Francis and quote the published article detailing its practices 
at length in their report. 54 It should not be forgotten – at the London 
wards explicitly – that psychiatrists who worked at the prestigious and 
world-leading Maudsley (psychiatric) Hospital also visited observation 
wards, especially the regular visits to St Francis’ by Edward Mapother 
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(superintendent of the Maudsley before the Second World War) and 
then Aubrey Lewis (as professor of psychiatry at the Maudsley-based 
Institute of Psychiatry). 55 These special circumstances at St Francis are 
acknowledged: ‘Few observation wards in other counties have consultant 
psychiatrists, officers and staff experienced in mental diseases, and all 
prognostic aids’. 56 Lewis and Calder end the report with a clear response 
to the treatment debate: ‘The fact we wish to urge is that the observation 
wards as organised at present cannot be said to cater for the treatment 
of large numbers of mild and early cases of mental illness that remain in 
the community’. 57 The potential link with ‘the social’ or ‘community’ 
emerges explicitly. 
 Finally, observation wards are significantly associated with practices 
of physical restraint, which has an impact upon the referral of patients 
considered dangerous (either to themselves or others), regardless of how 
often such techniques are used. The observation ward’s association with 
such patients has a history: a  Lancet editorial from the 1930s charac-
terises observation wards as a place for ‘acute and dangerous mental 
illness’. 58 In the late 1930s one of the functions of the St Francis Ward 
was ‘to secure the safe custody of patients pending their admission’ to 
a mental hospital. 59 This role persists after 1945. In 1954, Edinburgh 
consultant John Marshall argues that ‘[e]very general hospital group 
should have a psychiatric service with out-patient clinics, in-patient 
beds for suitable cases, and an observation unit for disturbed patients’, 60 
suggesting a significant controlling or restraining function. The poten-
tial for restraint and security at an observation ward makes it more likely 
for attempted suicide to become associated with such wards during this 
period, based upon the truism that attempted suicides are dangers to 
themselves. 
 To summarise, patients are compulsorily admitted to an observation 
ward for up to 17 days so that diagnosis can occur and the necessity 
for mental-hospital admission can be ascertained; formal treatment is 
discouraged, but is sometimes carried out, regardless. Thus, interwar 
observation wards can be characterised in terms of diagnosis, treat-
ment and security. Their role in diagnostic clearing marks them out as 
a boundary space between therapeutic approaches, where mental treat-
ment slowly becomes more acceptable. These ‘mixed’ clearing stations 
have an obscure but striking relationship with a more socially focussed 
psychological outlook, in both military and non-military terms. 
Attempted suicide continues to emerge in these places due to the coin-
cidence of mental and somatic concerns, reinforced by the secure provi-
sions around mental therapeutics. 
Early Twentieth-Century Self-Harm 57
 This chapter ends with one of the earliest attempted suicide studies 
in England and Wales. Whilst Stengel’s work at observation wards 
throughout the 1950s is acknowledged as central in the twentieth-cen-
tury concern around attempted suicide (see Chapter 2) the first published 
study of attempted suicide to emerge after the 1929 reorganisations and 
abolition of the poor law in England and Wales appears in 1937, a study 
conducted by Frederick Hopkins at an observation ward in Liverpool. 
This clinical object is fundamentally linked to the diagnostics, mixed 
therapeutics and secure nature characteristic of these wards. 
 Frederick Hopkins and attempted suicide (1937, 1943) 
 Hopkins is a rather obscure figure with an interest in child guidance 
(co-authoring an article on parental loss with Muriel Barton Hall 61 ); in 
1968 a lecture series is established in his name. 62 His work is mentioned 
above, describing three of the most numerous classes of patient (including 
attempted suicide) that pass through his former workhouse observa-
tion ward (in two divisions of a general hospital) at Smithdown Road 
(Liverpool) during the Second World War. The link with child guidance 
is important, as it links Hopkins with a profession committed to social 
management, which is drawn into the welfare state after 1945. In his 
1937 study, ‘Attempted Suicide: An Investigation’, he relates that these 
two divisions potentially receive ‘all cases of attempted suicide occurring 
in Liverpool’. 63 The association of these special wards with attempted 
suicide is made explicit. It has already been noted that in 1920 Liverpool 
police judge the workhouse infirmary especially suited for attempted 
suicides. 64 This is clearly related to the secure nature; the majority of 
those ‘whose mental condition or behaviour demands restraint and/
or supervision must be admitted to suitable institutional care’ and the 
majority of these ‘must in the first place go into a mental observation 
ward’. 65 
 It is noted that the observation ward does not quite have the general 
medical facilities to deal with emergencies, but links with acute somatic 
care are maintained through transfer: ‘Severe and urgent cases [of 
attempted suicide] may be admitted to the nearest hospital, but a large 
proportion of these, if they survive, are transferred [to the observation 
ward] when able to be moved’. 66 Even severe somatic emergencies make 
it to mental observation. As noted above, attempted suicide is one of 
three common reasons for admission. It is significant that the other two 
reasons – G.P.I. (since the establishment of the physical Wasserman test) 
and epilepsy are among the most securely somaticised mental disorders 
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of the period. There is also a sense that G.P.I. patients and epileptics 
both have the potential to be disruptive and/or violent. These two illness 
categories perform a negotiation between psychic and somatic medicine 
that is very different to attempted suicide, thereby showing that there is 
nothing fixed or inevitable about such crossover. 
 As noted, the rise of treatment in observation wards heralds a more 
intense type of psychological scrutiny. However, the treatment role is 
highly ambiguous at Smithdown Road: ‘In hospital, under conditions 
sheltered from ordinary life, they [patients] can take a more objective 
view. They are enabled to discuss and disentangle their mental complex-
ities, and there is an opportunity for readjustment with relatives and 
associates’. 67 Hopkins is open about the therapeutic effects that occur in 
observation wards – social adjustment with friends and family – without 
actively carrying out treatment. 
 Similarly, the intensity of the scrutiny Hopkins brings to bear on the 
attempted suicide patients is unclear. His study is undertaken to find out 
which factors are most important in provoking an attempted suicide. 
He initially states that ‘[t]he material and social conditions are known 
or easily investigated, and relatives, friends, relieving officers, police 
and probation officers are usually available to provide information’. 
However, he then changes tack, conceding that ‘[s]uch an enquiry obvi-
ously entails a great deal of work in the detailed investigation of each 
patient, the interviewing of relatives, friends and other informants’. He 
reveals that in a 1930s observation ward, with limited opportunities for 
psychiatric scrutiny, it ‘was decided to limit the number to 100 cases, 
taking 50 consecutive admissions of each sex’ and that ‘[n]o effort is 
made to consider ... its psychological mechanisms’. For Hopkins, ‘a real 
and complete understanding of the causes for such action would neces-
sitate so prolonged and detailed a study of the individual as is impossible 
in practice’. In remarkably explicit terms, Hopkins argues that a study 
of the ‘psychological mechanisms’ behind attempted suicide requires ‘a 
great deal of work’ and ‘detailed investigation’ – something that is just 
not possible in these wards at the time. 68 
 This does not stop Hopkins from speculating about these psycholog-
ical mechanisms and their significance, speculation that yields some-
thing rather similar to communicative self-harm in these observation 
wards. However, it is notable how cautious he is when describing it:
 It might be contended, and with reason, that in investigating a 
consecutive series of cases admitted to hospital on account of 
attempted suicide, one may be dealing not solely with cases who 
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have attempted self-destruction, but also with a proportion whose 
motive was essentially different, viz., to produce a similar effect in 
order to gain personal ends. That is to say, there may be cases whose 
actions are essentially hysterical, or comparable to the self-infliction 
of disabling wounds. A decision on this point, especially after the 
event, is always a difficult one. 69 
 The transformations that are already happening in observation wards 
(having a consulting psychiatrist such as Hopkins on the wards, for 
example) bring the potential to re-evaluate attempted suicide. 
 Hopkins mentions a certain kind of poisoning: ‘coal-gas poisoning is 
by far the most common method, in females accounting for nearly 70% 
of all suicides’ as well as the most common method overall. 70 He sees 
poisoning in general as associated with predominantly demonstrative 
attempts:
 The small number of poisoning cases that it was found necessary to 
send to mental hospital compares in striking fashion with the large 
percentage of what might be called the more violent methods. ... It 
may be that in this [poisoning] group there are many whose attempt 
has been more of the nature of a demonstration than a serious 
attempt at suicide. 71 
 However, Hopkins remains aware of his research limitations when 
appraising the stereotyped view ‘that suicidal attempts by women are 
commonly of the demonstrative, attention-seeking kind, without real 
intent to terminate life’. He is cautious and equivocal about this, arguing 
that although such a view may or may not be justified, ‘this investiga-
tion has shown that women are little less determined than are men’. 
Hopkins judges his research resources and opportunities too meagre to 
firmly establish a phenomenon or to generalise it. This is not to say 
that resources available for scrutiny (time, money, research assistants, 
etc.) correspond precisely to various characteristics of different research 
objects. However, some relationship does obtain between research 
objects and the level of scrutiny that produces them. The text quoted 
above seems at first a significant counterweight to the gender dynamic 
that appears so strongly in the textbooks, a dynamic that feminises 
attempted suicide. In fact, Hopkins has a gendered reason of his own: 
‘Impulsiveness, lack of knowledge and preparation result in fewer fatal 
endings to their [women’s] attempts’. 72 Hopkins’s gendering is achieved 
on the basis of impulsiveness and ignorance rather than on gendered 
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intent (although he acknowledges that the ‘intent’ argument has been 
made). 
 He again mentions the effort that has gone into his series: not only 
why the patient decided to carry out the attempt but also any prior 
circumstances. One of his key findings here involves the term ‘domestic 
stress’, which 
 is somewhat vague, but is meant to include such circumstances as 
deaths in the family, quarrels and disharmony on various accounts, 
such as religion, inconstancy, maintenance, etc. It is not surprising 
that the numbers under this heading should be comparatively large 
when the emotional relationships of family life have so many aspects. 
As might be expected, the effects were more frequent in women, 
because to women life as a rule is focused domestically. 73 
 He has no doubt that the large number of cases concerning women aged 
twenty-five or younger (twice the number of men in this age group) is ‘is 
due to the hazards of love affairs and of early married life, misfortunes 
in these circumstances bearing more hardly on the female’. 74 Thus a 
domestic-romantic social setting is projected from an observation ward, 
in order to explain an attempted suicide. This socially focused explana-
tion is clearly linked to psychological notions of stress. 
 This domestic social constellation is focused upon the events imme-
diately preceding the attempt, part of what Hopkins calls ‘precipitating 
causes’. These include ‘mental disorder’ (where ‘the immediate cause 
of the action was the abnormal state of the patient’s mind’), as well 
as ‘[d]omestic stress’, ‘[b]usiness or economic stress’, ‘[a]lcohol’ or 
‘[a]matory disturbances’. However, these exist in a dynamic relationship 
with much longer-term ‘conditioning causes’, which ‘include charac-
teristics of personality showing definite deviation from the normal (or 
average), and physical states that were the primary cause of changes in 
the mental attitude’. These more long-term factors are considered inac-
cessible to this research project. However, Hopkins is clearly aware of 
their import – again through his work in child guidance. 75 This interplay 
between past and present factors, either in the social environment or 
the broader domains of aetiology, is investigated and reconfigured by 
various psychiatric workers during the 1950s and 1960s. Principally, the 
shift occurs between those emphasising the aetiological significance of 
childhood emotional trauma and those focussed upon current domestic 
stress and marital pathology. 
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 Concluding thoughts 
 Hopkins’s socially embedded object is very different to the finan-
cial disputes of police watching, in which rejected patients are ferried 
between institutions across significant distances. The referral arrange-
ments at Smithdown Road mean that Hopkins is able to aggregate 
psychiatric evaluations of patients whose physical injuries require urgent 
somatic treatment in the first instance. The secure nature of the ward 
also encourages referral of attempted suicides, who have technically 
committed a crime as well as being thought dangerous to themselves. 
There is also the question of growing psychological scrutiny through 
treatment, at sites attached to general hospitals, although Hopkins’s 
research resources are still rather meagre. 
 At the Ashton inquest the essence of attempted suicide as either 
psychological or somatic is debated, corresponding to therapeutic 
regimes so separate that they are a ‘joy ride’ apart. After the reorgani-
sations of 1929–30 a different context obtains. Along with the secure 
nature of observation wards, the key contextual factor in attempted 
suicide is its position between the two distinct regimes of mental and 
general medicine. These are broadly contained in the mixed diagnostic/
therapeutic environment of an observation ward, but their potential 
connection is also enhanced by referral practices mentioned briefly 
by Hopkins. The emergence of a socially embedded attempted suicide 
centrally concerns this secure and liminal therapeutic space. It helps to 
reconstitute attempted suicide as a new object for scrutiny. This limi-
nality within general hospitals remains the focus in the next chapter, 
in the context of a radical extension of activity by the state in the arena 
of social work (especially child and marriage guidance) and socialised 
medicine (the NHS). 
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